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Norman Dorsen, who clerked for John Marshall Harlan II, did not adopt the 
same judicial philosophy as the Justice he worked for. He did, however, 
develop a strong respect for his one-time mentor. The desire of Justice Harlan 
to provide balance in all things, "to keep things on an even keel," as Dorsen 
remembers him saying, well represents the judicial philosophy of Harlan.1 
Harlan came from a family of some political and legal prestige, and his upper 
class background, his commitment to federalism and the separation of powers, 
and his desire to hold to neutral principles on the Court shaped his judicial 
philosophy. 
The Harlan family immigrated to colonial America to escape the persecution 
directed toward Quakers in England. Family members migrated westward, and 
Harlan's great-grandfather, James, became a prominent figure in Kentucky 
politics prior to the Civil War. He served in the state legislature and as the 
secretary of state and attorney general, and later, two terms as a member of 
Congress. His support of the Union cause led Lincoln to appoint James the 
United States Attorney for Kentucky. 
James named one of his sons John Marshall Harlan, after the great Chief 
Justice. Like his father, John also became active in state politics, and was 
catapulted into the national political spotlight by helping Rutherford B. Hayes 
secure the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1876. Following the 
controversial resolution of the election, Harlan narrowly missed being appointed 
the administration's Attorney General, but later in 1877, he was appointed to 
the United States Supreme Court. His thirty-four year tenure remains one of the 
longest in court history, and his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson remains one of 
the best-known dissents in the Court's history. 
1 Norman Dorsen, "John Marshall Harlan and the Warren Court," in The Warren 
Court in Political and Historical Perspective, ed. Mark Tushnet, (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1995), 109. 
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During the Civil War, John Marshall Harlan the elder fought for the Union, 
although he maintained some Southern sympathies. As a member of the Court, 
he displayed a commitment to the Union; the application of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to protect black citizens; and the goals 
of Reconstruction. As a result, he often played the role of dissenter on the 
conservative Court of the late-nineteenth century. 
Harlan's son, John Maynard, was born in 1864 and received his collegiate 
education at Princeton, the University of Berlin, and what is now George 
Washington University. He established a successful law practice in Chicago, 
but was more attracted to the political world. After being elected alderman, John 
Maynard ran a competitive, but poorly financed, campaign for mayor. He was 
considered to be too much of a reformer to gain full Republican support, and 
the opposition Democratic Party had a strong machine establishment in the city. 
He failed to win the election and returned to his law practice, making a 
substantial income representing business interests in the Chicago area. 
John Marshall Harlan II was born May 20, 1899, one of four children and the 
only son. Sickly as a child, Harlan was sent to preparatory school in Canada on 
the advice of a physician who said that a more rigorous climate could either "kill 
or cure" the boy.2 After several years in Canada, Harlan was sent to an elite 
preparatory school in New York in order to develop American connections. In 
1916 he enrolled in Princeton, and his strong academic work as an 
undergraduate led to his being named as a Rhodes scholar. Harlan went on to 
study law at Oxford's Balliol College, earning a first in jurisprudence and 
graduating seventh in a class of one hundred twenty. 
Upon his return to America, Harlan landed a job at the Wall Street firm, 
Root, Clark, Buckner, and Harlan. He soon developed a close professional 
relationship with Emory Buckner, a senior partner at the firm and one of New 
York's premier trial lawyers. Unlike many other firms at the time, Root, Clark 
encouraged its attorneys to take advantage of public service opportunities. 
When Buckner was named United States attorney in New York, Harlan went 
along as an assistant, becoming part of a group of rising young attorneys 
known as Buckner's "Boy Scouts." Harlan's outstanding work led Buckner to 
describe Harlan as "Poise in Motion" and "Persistence Personified."3 
Harlan spent much of his time trying to enforce New York's liquor laws. 
Enforcing Prohibition in New York proved difficult for multiple reasons. First, the 
sheer numbers of violations made prosecution virtually impossible. Each week 
2 Tinsley Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan: Great Dissenter of the Warren Court, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 6. 
3 J. Edward Lumbard, "John Harlan: In Public Service 1925-1971," Harvard Law 
Review 85 (December 1971 ): 372. 
87 
police arrested thousands, mostly low-level employees like waiters, porters, 
bartenders and bellhops.4 Rarely were the owners of the establishments or the 
distributors of the bootleg liquor charged. 
Harlan's work in Prohibition did garner him public attention, due to the 
"Bathroom Venus" case. 5 A naked showgirl dipped into a tub filled with 
champagne at an e.vening party. Several men lowered glasses into the tub and 
drank the alcohol, violating Prohibition laws. The newspapers certainly filled 
their columns with the information surrounding the case. Later, Governor AI 
Smith asked Buckner to investigate the Queens sewer scandal. Again, Harlan 
assisted his mentor in uncovering bribes and kickbacks. When Justice Learned 
Hand, then a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in New York, read Harlan's brief for the case, he was immediately 
impressed. John Marshall Harlan was quickly developing a reputation as one of 
New York's premier attorneys. 
Harlan left his career behind in 1942, however, to journey to England and 
serve in the Operations Analysis Section of the Eighth Bomber Command. By 
that time he was in his early forties, past the normal age of a soldier, but the 
army felt that lawyers would be essential for the project due to their expertise at 
mastering technical information and then communicating it to a general 
audience.6 The main problem Harlan faced when assuming his role was that 
fewer than five percent of the bombs dropped during daylight bombing raids in 
Germany were falling within five hundred feet of their target. In order to 
understand the predicament better, Harlan actually accompanied a crew on a 
bombing mission, keeping his participation a secret from his team, so that they 
would not prevent him from going. For his work, Harlan received the Legion of 
Merit and the Croix de Guerre from France and Belgium. 
Upon his return from the war, Harlan resumed where he had left off and 
continued to represent some of the most prominent cases in the New York 
area, including successfully defending Pierre du Pont in an anti-trust lawsuit. 
Compared to Earl Warren, his future fellow Supreme Court judge, Harlan had 
fairly little political experience, but in early 1954, a vacancy appeared on the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Due, in part, to Harlan's longtime 
friendship with Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, Harlan was 
nominated and confirmed. His one year on the court was noncontroversial. The 
most interesting case was United States v. Flynn, in which Harlan upheld the 
conviction of a dozen second-string members of the American Communist 
4 Yarbrough, Harlan, 11. 
5 1bid., 39. 
6 1bid., 58. 
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Party. Although Harlan deferred to the state government in upholding the 
convictions, a the.me that would dominate his tenure on the Supreme Court, he 
quickly became upset with McCarthyism and would find ways to limit the 
influence of the Red Scare once on the high court. 
In October 1954 Justice Robert H. Jackson died. Due to his judicial 
experience and the fact that Jackson had been the only New Yorker on the 
Court, Harlan seemed the perfect selection to fill the vacancy. Eisenhower had 
received some criticism for his nomination of Earl Warren and his limited judicial 
experience, but Harlan had a reputation for being a lawyer's lawyer, expert in 
his handling of all the details in a given case. Both as an attorney and during his 
brief tenure as a judge, his legal reputation was sterling. His New York 
residency would also maintain the geographic balance on the Court. In 
nominating him to the Court, Eisenhower said Harlan's qualifications were "the 
highest of any I could find."7 The American Bar Association concurred and gave 
Harlan its highest recommendation, as well. In addition, Harlan was supported 
by such legal experts as Judge Learned Hand, Senator Estes Kefauver, and 
heavyweight champ Gene Tunney, whom Harlan had represented in an 
earnings protection case in New York. 
With such credentials and support, Harlan seemed like a candidate for a 
quick confirmation. One conservative friend even wrote Harlan, saying he 
hoped the new Justice would be able to reign in the liberal leaning of Justice 
William Douglas.8 The confirmation, however, would take four months. Several 
factors delayed the process. First, the Senate had to deal with the decision to 
censure Senator McCarthy. Second, a bloc of southern senators had decided to 
take this opportunity once again to make public their dissatisfaction with the 
Court's rulings regarding race, especially the Brown decision. Senator James 
Eastland (D-Mississippi) was even prepared to disclose Harlan's past affiliation 
with the Communist Party, until he realized the John Harlan he had information 
on was from Baltimore.9 Third, Republican Senator William Langer of North 
Dakota threatened to hold up the nomination until someone from his state or a 
state that had yet to receive an appointment to the Court was selected. A fourth 
problem came from Harlan's experience as a Rhodes scholar. Some feared his 
time spent in Europe must have made him an internationalist. Despite some 
senatorial fears that his time at Oxford had made him a "one-worlder" who 
7 Norman Dorsen, "John Marshall Harlan," in The Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions vol. IV, ed. Leon 
Friedman and Fred L. Israel, 2803-46 (New York: Chelsea House Review, 1969), 
2805. 
8 Yarbrough, Harlan, 72. 
9 Ibid., 103. 
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would sell out American sovereignty to the United Nation's "world government," 
Harlan was confirmed by a 71-11 vote on March 16, 1955.10 
One cannot read about Harlan for very long without seeing him described 
as a "patrician." Norman Dorsen pointed out the criticism that some might be 
tempted to conclude "that his frequent unwillingness to accept constitutional 
claims based on alleged equal treatment of poor persons is somehow related to 
his failure to understand or to sympathize with poorer members of society."11 
Mark Tushnet extended this criticism, calling Harlan's decision in Poe v. Ullman 
a "jurisprudence of country-club Republicanism. 12 One of the wives of a 
member of Harlan's Wall Street firm was on the board of Planned Parenthood 
in Connecticut, and this, according to Tushnet, must have influenced his 
opinion on the issue of the Connecticut birth control law that ultimately led to 
the Griswold decision concerning the right to marital privacy. 
Whatever the influence of Harlan's wealthy background, there are other 
more clearly identifiable influences on his judicial philosophy. As soon as 
Harlan was nominated as justice, Felix Frankfurter was delighted at the addition 
of a member to his restrainist wing of the Court. In NAACP v. Alabama (in 
which the Court ultimately decided the state of Alabama could not force the 
NAACP to make public its membership roster), Frankfurter heavily lobbied 
Harlan to delete any First Amendment references in connection with the 
Fourteenth Amendment from his opinion, in order to avoid any hint of 
incorporation. Yet Harlan was his own man and felt free to disregard 
Frankfurter's recommendations, as he did in Poe v. Ullman. However, Harlan 
must have appreciated Frankfurter's guidance in constitutional areas in which 
his previous law practice had given him little experience. On balance, Harlan 
agreed with Frankfurter on eighty percent of the cases they heard together.13 
Perhaps the two strongest guiding stars of Justice Harlan's philosophy were 
the concepts of federalism and separation of powers. He firmly believed that 
these were the best safeguards of individual liberty, more so than specific 
constitutional guarantees. Under the system of divided powers established by 
10 Nathan Lewin, "John Marshall Harlan," in The Supreme Court Justices: 
Illustrated Biographies, 1789-1995, ed. Clare Cushman, 441-45 (Washington, D.C.: 
Con~ressional Quarterly, 1995), 443. 
1 Norman Dorsen, "The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional 
Conservative," New York Law Review 44 (April1969): 253. 
12 Mark Tushnet, "Members of the Warren Court in Judicial Biography: Themes in 
Warren Court Biographies." New York University Law Review, 1995, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/scholastic, November 2, 2002. 
13 Lewin, "John Marshall Harlan," 444. 
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the framers, Harlan was willing to grant great authority to the states, as well as 
a strong role for the legislatures at both the state and national levels. 
Harlan was not hesitant in invoking the "abstention" doctrine, which limited 
the reach of the judiciary's role in matters of judicial intervention, and he proved 
one of the strongest supporters of the "state action" concept, which stated the 
Constitution's civil liberties protections extended to state, but not private, 
activity. 14 He revered precedent, perhaps an influence of the common law 
tradition he became so familiar with during his stint at Oxford, and would adhere 
closely to previous decisions, even ones he had disagreed with, and perhaps 
even registered dissents on in the past. An excerpt from his opinion in Avery v. 
Midland County, a county-level reapportionment case, clearly illustrates his 
great respect for stare decisis. 
I continue to think that these adventures of the Court in the realm of 
political science are beyond its constitutional powers, for reasons set 
forth at length in my dissenting opinion in Reynolds .... However, now 
that the Court has decided otherwise, judicial self-discipline requires me 
to follow the political dogma now constitutionally embedded in 
consequence of that decision.15 
The theoretical background for Justice Harlan's philosophy can be found in 
Herbert Wechsler's concept of neutral principles. According to Kent Greenwalt, 
who clerked for Harlan, " ... no modern Justice had striven harder or more 
successfully than Justice Harlan to perform his responsibilities in the manner 
suggested by the model."16 Wechsler attempted to resolve the inherent conflict 
of how the act of judicial review could be justified when they inherently involve 
choices of value. According to Wechsler: 
The answer ... inheres primarily in that they are -- or are obliged to be --
entirely principled. A principled decision is one that rests on reasons 
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality 
and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. 17 
14 Yarbrough, Harlan, 158. 
15 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), http://www.findlaw.com, October 
24,2002. 
16 Kent Greenwalt, "The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles," Columbia 
Law Review 78 (June 1978): 984. 
17 Ibid., 985. 
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Five general principles explain this concept further. First, a neutral ruling 
would be one in which a person would be willing to follow the decision in other 
situations to which it applies. Second, a ruling must possess some degree of 
generality, addressing the legal principle underlying the case and how related 
cases ought to be addressed. Third, judges must confine their rulings to 
principles that have. legal relevance; just because an argument is moral does 
not mean a judge is free to adopt it. Fourth, a principled ruling must address all 
of the issues in a case, not a select few. Finally, that reasoning must be 
reflected in the opinion delivered by the court; a court would fail in giving no 
reasons or false reasons for its decision. 18 
Chief Justice Warren employed a different judicial approach, looking for 
evidence of fairness in each case. Warren's approach, which often left little 
room for deference to the legislative bodies, was not based on the 
reasonableness of neutral principles, but the rightness or morality of the 
outcome.18 
With such a different judicial philosophy, it is not surprising that Justice 
Harlan earned the reputation for being the great dissenter of the Warren Court. 
Harlan's dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, a case concerning Alabama's 
apportionment of state senatorial districts, summarizes many of the flaws of 
those who moved away from legal process theory. 19 
The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters [of intent, 
language, contemporary understanding, political practice, subsequent 
amendments, and constitutional decisions] cannot be excused or 
explained by any concept of "developing" constitutionalism. It is 
meaningless to speak of constitutional "development" when both the 
language and history of the controlling provisions of the Constitution are 
wholly ignored.20 
Miranda v. Arizona was one of the most controversial Warren Court 
decisions. To understand the public outcry against the ruling, one must first 
understand the context in which it occurred. Decided in 1963 Gideon v. 
Wainwright, mandating that an accused, indigent criminal be provided an 
attorney for trial was perhaps the only popular criminal procedural decision 
during its own time that the Warren Court issued. The case revolved around the 
fundamental unfairness a defendant would face in the technical word of the 
18 Ibid., 985-90. 
19 Norman Oorsen, "John Marshall Harlan," 121. 
20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964), http://www.findlaw.com, October24, 
2002. 
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courtroom without adequate representation. The decision, in effect, overturned 
Betts v. Brady (1~42), and while Justice Harlan concurred with the decision, his 
respect for precedent could be seen in the opening lines of his opinion. "I agree 
that Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but consider it entitled to a more 
respectful burial than has been accorded."21 Harlan went on to describe his 
rationale for supporting Gideon's appeal, while denying the theory that the case 
incorporated the Sixth Amendment's provision for counsel. Gideon raised little 
controversy because several states already complied with the standards the 
Supreme Court enunciated, and twenty-two state attorneys general had filed an 
amicus brief on behalf of the defendant. 22 
Once the Court ruled in Gideon that the Sixth Amendment applied to the 
states, they were forced to address the issue of right to counsel. Did the right 
only begin at trial or when custodial interrogation began? 
In Escobedo v. Illinois the Court attempted to answer the question. Police 
had detained Danny Escobedo for questioning in a murder case. He demanded 
to see his lawyer, and his lawyer, then at the police station, demanded to see 
his client. The police refused both requests and falsely told Escobedo that he 
could go home if he implicated another man. They did not tell him that under 
Illinois law, if he implicated someone else, he also implicated himself.23 The 
Court ruled in a controversial 5-4 decision that the right to counsel began when 
the criminal process shifted from an investigatory to an accusatory nature. 
Thus, when Escobedo was being questioned, his constitutional right to counsel 
was violated, and by extension, his right to avoid self-incrimination also was 
denied. His conviction was reversed and the case remanded to the state for 
reconsideration. 
Justice Harlan began his brief dissent by stating, " ... 1 think the rule 
announced today is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiably 
fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement."24 His reaction 
showed more restraint than many others. The Los Angeles Chief of Police 
complained that the decision "handcuffed the police," and New York City Police 
Chief "Michael J. Murphy agreed, stating the Court's ruling was "akin to 
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963), http://www.findlaw.com, October 24, 
2002. 
22 Yale Kamisar, "The Warren Court and Criminal Justice," in The Warren Court: A 
Retrospective, ed. Bernard Schwartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 119. 
23 Powe, Lucas A. Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 389. 
24 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), http://www.findlaw.com, October 24, 
2002. 
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requiring one boxer to fight by the Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting 
the other to butt, gouge, and bite."25 
More and more Americans were beginning to wonder if the rising crime rate 
was attributable to what they viewed as permissive court decisions. Bumper 
stickers stating, "Support Your local Police" began to appear next to the ones 
reading, "Impeach Earl Warren." At the 1964 Republican Convention, 
Eisenhower urged delegates: 
" ... not to be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the 
streets with switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a prey, 
suddenly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged person 
who courts upon the compassion of our society and the weakness of 
many courts to forgive his offense.26 
According to historian John Morton Blum, "Escobedo raised the storm 
against the Court to gale force."27 
It was in this hostile atmosphere that Miranda reached the Court. The facts 
of the case are fairly simple. Shortly after midnight on March 4, 1963, Emesto 
Miranda accosted and seized an eighteen-year-old woman, forcing her into the 
back of his car. He bound her, drove to the desert east of Phoenix, and raped 
her. He then drove her back to her neighborhood and released her. Before 
departing he said, "Whether you tell your mother what has happened or not is 
none of my business, but pray for me."28 
After finding Miranda by tracing a partial license plate number provided by 
the victim, police asked Miranda to accompany them to the police station for 
questioning. Miranda voluntarily complied. The victim was unable to identify 
Miranda from a lineup, so police continued questioning Miranda. He was not 
provided an attorney, nor did he ask for one. After two hours of interrogation, 
Miranda admitted his guilt and signed a statement of confession. Found guilty 
of kidnapping and rape, Miranda was sentenced to twenty to thirty years in 
prison. 
The case was appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which upheld the 
conviction, ruling that Miranda's due process rights were not violated because 
he had not asked for an attorney. Miranda gained new representation from the 
25 Powe. Warren Court, 391. 
26 Theodore H White, The Making of the President, 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 
1965), 241-42. 
2 John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 210. 
28 Liva Baker, Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics (New York: Atheneum, 1983), 5. 
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American Civil Liberties Union, and the new attorneys filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to hear the case and rule whether an 
attorney must be provided for an indigent facing police interrogation. 
Again, the Court issued a 5-4 decision, with Justices Harlan, White, Clark, 
and Stewart dissenting. Later, Justice Fortas acknowledged that the majority 
opinion was "entirely" Warren's, and when Warren announced the decision he 
spent an hour reading it in the courtroom.29 The Chief Justice established a 
four-point summary that would be spoken to individuals taken into custody to 
ensure the privilege against self-incrimination was not violated. 
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must 
be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings 
have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may 
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer 
questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence 
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.30 
These precautions would not only preserve a Fifth Amendment protection, 
but Warren also believed they would prevent the "third degree" during police 
interrogations; ameliorate the disparity between rich and poor in obtaining 
counsel; and bring police tactics to the same professional level by relying more 
on strong investigative techniques and less on custodial confessions. 
The dissents by Harlan and White were especially sharp. Again, Justice 
Harlan succinctly presented his view of the majority opinion in his first sentence. 
"I believe the decision of the Court represents poor constitutional law and 
entails harmful consequences for the country at large."31 Harlan believed the 
warnings that would be issued to all suspects would not end the use of 
questionable police tactics. Those who had lied before about the practices used 
in questioning could continue to lie. Worse still, the Court, in Harlan's judgment, 
was departing from precedent and taking the police power away from the 
29 PaulL Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969 (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971), 381. 
30 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), http://www.findlaw.com, September 
23,2002. 
31 Ibid. 
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states, where it had traditionally resided. Perhaps from his years assisting 
Buckner as a prosecutor, Harlan viewed police questioning as an essential and 
effective tool when properly used. 
Earlier in Gideon, Harlan had supported the right of all defendants to have 
proper counsel at trial, but he denied that the right extended, based on 
historical precedent, to custodial questioning. While it was true, he said, that 
innocent people were sometimes detained and questioned, that was a part of 
our system of justice. "Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, 
and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law."32 
Justice Harlan also attacked the basis of the Chief Justice's decision: the 
concept of fairness. Miranda confessed after a relatively brief interrogation 
during daylight hours, with no violence or threat of violence present. 
They assured a conviction for a brutal and unsettling crime, for which 
the police had and quite possibly could obtain little evidence other than 
the victim's identifications, evidence which is frequently unreliable. 
There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, no perceptible unfairness, and 
certainly little risk of injustice in the interrogation. Yet the resulting 
confessions, and the responsible course of police practice they 
represent, are to be sacrificed to the Court's own finespun conception of 
fairness which I seriously doubt is shared by many thinking citizens in 
this country.33 
While the goal of the majority may have been to ensure that only voluntary 
confessions would be extracted in custodial questioning, Harlan believed the 
ruling went too far. 
" ... the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the 
nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any 
confession at all. The aim in short is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian 
sense, or to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with a 
vengeance."34 
Justice White, in his dissent, was at least as equally harsh. He decried what 
he viewed as an unfair and dangerous hampering of law enforcement officials' 
32 1bid. 
33 1bid. 
34 Ibid. 
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ability to do their jobs. In a sarcastic swipe at the majority, he claimed a desire 
to wash his hands of the decision. 
I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such 
impact on the present criminal process. In some unknown number of 
cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the 
streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime 
whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but 
a loss, in human dignity. There is, of course, a saving factor: the next 
victims are uncertain, unnamed and unrepresented in this case. 35 
Again, public reaction to the decision was strong, even stronger than the 
reaction to Escobedo. One law enforcement official said, "I guess now we'll 
have to supply all squad cars with lawyers," while another complained that 
"criminal trials no longer be about a search for truth, but search for technical 
error."36 
At hearings that summer, Truman Capote, the author of the recently-
released best seller In Cold Blood testified the murderers of the Clutter family 
would have been released had the Miranda ruling been in effect. Comments 
like these paved the way for the Republicans and Nixon to run a "law and order" 
campaign in 1968. One of Nixon's favorite lines in a stock campaign speech 
took advantage of public fear of criminal activity. "In the past forty-five minutes, 
this is what happened in America. There has been one murder, two rapes, 
forty-five major crimes of violence, countless robberies and auto thefts."37 
George Wallace also campaigned on the same issue, telling crowds, "If you 
walk out of this hotel tonight and someone knocks you on the head, he'll be out 
of jail before you're out of the hospital, and on Monday Morning they'll try the 
policeman instead of the criminal."38 
Despite widespread opposition to the ruling, hints of acceptance began to 
appear. Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act, signed into law by 
the president, attempting to invalidate the Miranda decision, but law 
enforcement agencies ignored it for the most part, choosing to follow the more 
stringent guidelines set up in the Court's ruling. 
This was not the only example of the nation's gradual acceptance of 
Miranda. Subsequent cases somewhat lessened the public's concern about the 
35 1bid. 
36 Powe, Warren Court, 399. 
37 1bid., 410. 
38 Ibid., 410. 
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lack of police power. Schmerber v. California, decided one week after Miranda, 
held that a blood sample could be unwillingly taken from a suspect to help 
prove guilt or innocence in a crime. By the early 1970s most prominent law 
officials held the view that Miranda did not hamper law enforcement efforts. 
Most law enforcement officials found that closer attention to procedural 
safeguards did not h.amper their police work. 
Miranda has gained even more respectability in the past decade. At her 
confirmation hearings, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg defended the ruling, 
saying, "It is an assurance that the law is going to be administered even-
handedly because, as I said, sophisticated defendants who have counsel 
ordinarily will know about their rights .... "39 There is no reason to think that 
Justice Harlan would have accepted this statement by Justice Ginsburg, as it 
seems to imply an equal protection rationale for supporting the case. Ironically, 
though, he most likely would uphold Miranda today, even as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist did for a unanimous court in Dickerson v. United States. 
We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may 
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to 
overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its 
progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during 
custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.40 
Miranda has apparently become an accepted volume in the canon of 
American jurisprudence. 
After Miranda Harlan continued to serve with distinction on the Court, 
despite growing ailments and blindness. While he continued to view his judicial 
philosophy as one of moderation, he increasingly found himself presenting 
dissenting opinions in many Warren Court decisions. As Harlan's vision 
worsened, he increasingly relied on his clerks in preparing for cases and in 
writing decisions. The Court, as an accommodation for Harlan's failing eyesight, 
allowed him to have one extra clerk his last several years on the bench. He 
resigned from the Court in late 1971 and died before the year's end. 
Ernesto Miranda was retried and again convicted. Due, in part, to his 
attempts at self-education while in prison he was released on parole almost one 
year after Justice Harlan died. Later, he was stopped for driving on the wrong 
side of the road, and a search of the car revealed a gun and illegal drugs, 
39 Kamisar, "The Warren Court," 119. 
40 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), http://www.findlaw.com, 
October 24, 2002. 
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violations of his parole. He was sent back to jail, again paroled, and to 
supplement his i~come, sold autographed Miranda cards for $2.00. In 1976 
after a bar fight over gambling, Ernesto Miranda was stabbed in the stomach 
and the upper chest. At the hospital he was pronounced dead on arrival. A 
suspect in the crime was detained by police, refused to talk, and was released. 
He has never been seen since. 
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